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1. Introduction
•Overwhelming development of mobile technologies
and services [1].
•Large-scale deployment of Android-based
devices [2].
•However, security issues require special attention.
xHostile environments involving vulnerabilities and mal-
ware.
x Lack of standard and mature means for exchanging An-
droid related security information.
x Limited resources on mobile devices.
The Big Question
How do we increase the vulnerability
awareness of Android-based devices?
⇒We propose a lightweight OVAL-based frame-
work to efficiently increase vulnerability detection
capabilities in the Android platform. X
2. The OVAL Language
•Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language [3].
• Information security standard for assessing and re-
porting the machine state of computer systems.
-Representing system configuration information for testing.
-Analyzing the system for the presence of the specified ma-
chine state.
-Reporting the results of the assessment.
3. The Model
• P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. Set of atomic properties to
observe on target systems.
• V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}. Set of vulnerabilities com-
posed of a logical combination of properties pi.
Vulnerability pattern matrix (n=5, m=3) example:
v1 = (p1, p3, p5)
v2 = (p2, p4)
v3 = (p1, p2, p5)
 PM3,5 =

1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1

System state properties encoded as:
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) si ∈ {0, 1}











⇒ Vulnerability assessment process:












a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,n
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,n
... ... . . . ...









Vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wm) denotes the status of
each vulnerability vi in the target system. A null en-
try wi indicates that vulnerability vi is present in the
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The Important Fact
Real autonomy can only be achieved if we are
able to ensure safe mobile configurations.
7. Conclusions and Outlook
•Mathematical model for supporting the vulnerabil-
ity assessment process.
•Lightweight distributed OVAL-based framework
for efficiently detecting vulnerable mobile config-
urations.
•Comprehensive set of experiments that show the
feasibility of the proposed approach.
•Future work.
-Protection mechanisms within the assessment framework.
- Security advisory exchange between neighboring devices.
- Integration of distributed vulnerabilities descriptions to de-
tect mobile massive attack scenarios [4].
-Closure of the vulnerability management lifecycle by per-
forming corrective tasks thus getting closer to real auto-
nomic solutions [5].
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